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THE WITHDRAWAL AND ACCEPTANCE OF PREINCORPORATION SUBSCRIPTIONS TO STOCK.*
EDWARD CLARK LuKENS

A good deal of litigation has arisen regarding subscriptions
to stock made prior to the formation of the corporation. It is
well settled that in general such subscriptions may be enforced
by the corporation after it is formed.1 That is, if a subscription 2 is made and is not withdrawn, and the corporation is properly formed 3 and notifies the subscriber of its acceptance of the
'Collins v. Morgan Grain Co., 16 F.(2d) 253 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926);
Planters Co. v. Webb, 156 Ala. 551, 46 So. 977 (19o8); Scott v. Houpt, 73
Ark. 78, 83 S. W. 1057 (19o4); Kohler v. Agassiz, 99 Cal. 9, 33 Pac. 741
(1893); Danbury R. Co. v. Wilson, 22 Conn. 435 (1853); National Bank v.
Amoss, 144 Ga. 425, 87 S. E. 406 (1915) ; Stone v. Great Western Co., 41 Ill.
85 (1866) ; McCormick v. Great Bend Co., 48 Kan. 614, 29 Pac. 1147 (1892) ;
Bullock v. Falmouth Co., 85 Ky. 184, 3 S. W. 129 (1887) ; Bryant's Pond Co.
v. Felt, 87 Me. 234, 32 Atl. 888 (1895) ; Athol Music Hall Co. v. Carey, 116
Mass. 471 (1875); Minneapolis Co. v. Davis, 40 Minn. no, 41 N. W. lO26
(1889); State v. Reynolds, 268 Mo. 2IO, 186 S. W. 1057 (1916); Deschamps
v. Loiselle, 50 Mont 565, 148 Pac. 335 (1915) ; Nebraska Chicory Co. v. Lednicky, 79 Neb. 587, 113 N. W. 245 (19o7) ; Ashuelot Boot & Shoe Co. v. Hoit,
56 N. H. 548 (1876); Buffalo & N. Y. C. R. Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. 336
(1856) ; Boushall v. Stronach, 172 N. C. 273, 90 S. E. igs (1916) ; King v.
Howeth & Co., 42 Okla. 178, 14o Pac. 1182 (1914) ; Balfour v. Baker City Gas
Co., 27 Ore. 300, 41 Pac. 164 (895) ; Jeannette Bottle Works v. Schall, 13 Pa.
Super. 96 (igoo) ; Seacoast Packing Co. v. Long, 116 S. C. 406, io8 S. E. 159
(i92i); Cartwright v. Dickenson, 88 Tenn. 476, 12 S. W. 1030 (I89O); McCord v. Southwestern Sundries Co., 158 S. W. 226 (Texas 1913) ; Utah Hotel
Co. v. Madsen, 43 Utah 285, 134 Pac. 577 (1913) ; Lewis' Adm'r v. Glenn, 84
Va. 947, 6 S. E. 866 (1888) ; Martin v. Rothwell, 81 W. Va. 681, 95 S. E. 189
(1918). As this fundamental proposition is undisputed and practically all the
cases cited in this article support it, it seems unnecessary at this point to cite
more than one case in any jurisdiction.
'A distinction is sometimes made between a real subscription and a mere
promise to subscribe, or some other kind of pre-incorporation promise which
is not an actual subscription. See Avon Springs Sanitarium Co. v. Weed,
1O4 N. Y. Supp. 58, rev'd on other grounds, 189 N. Y. 557, 82 N. E. 1123
(1907); Sanders v. Barnaby, 166 App. Div. 274, 151 N. Y. Supp. 580 (1915);
Lake Ontario Shore R. Co. v. Curtiss, 8o N. Y. 219 (i88o) ; Yonkers Gazette
Co. v. Taylor, 3o App. Div. 334, 51 N. Y. Supp. 969 (1898); Woods Motor
Vehicle Co. v. Brady, 181 N. Y. 153, 73 N. E. 674 (1905); Strassburg R. C.
Co. v. Echternacht, 21 Pa. 220 (1853); Phila. Medical Publishing Co. v.
Wolfenden, 248 Pa. 450, 94 AtI. 138 (1915). As to the validity of such a distinction, see MoRA-viTz, CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1886) § 49, and I COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed., 1923) 383.
'A defect in the corporate organization is held to be a defense to a suit to
enforce a subscription made prior to incorporation in Schloss & Kahn v. Montgomery Trade Co., 87 Ala. 411, 6 So. 36o (1889); Clark v. Barnes, 58 Mo.
(423)
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subscription, it can enforce the subscription even though it was
made before the corporation was in existence.
The validity of pre-incorporation subscriptions is generally
based upon one of two theories, that the subscription is a continuing offer to the prospective corporation which is accepted
by the corporation when or after it comes into existence, or that
it is a contract with the other subscribers as well as an offer to
the corporation. Where a corporation after it is formed sues to
enforce such a subscription which remains unrevoked, the subscription is binding under either theory, and it makes no practical
difference which the court relies upon.
It is in the case of an attempted withdrawal of the subscription before organization is completed that the difference becomes
important. If the subscription is only an offer to the corporation it must be unaccepted as long as the corporation is not yet
in existence, and can therefore be withdrawn. If on the other
hand it is a contract between the subscribers it is binding as soon
as it is made, and there can be no withdrawal. There is a distinct division of authority on this, a large majority of the cases
holding that a subscription can be withdrawn at any time before
the corporation is formed, 4 while the view that it is a contract
App. 667 (1894); Capps & McCreary v. Hastings Prospecting Co., 4o Neb.
470, 58 N. W. 956 (1894) ; Dorris v. Sweeney, 6o N. Y. 463 (875) ; Bywaters
v. P. & G. N. Ry. Co., 73 Tex. 624, i1 S. W. 856 (1889). This defense is
denied in Allen v. Rhodes, 23o Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916) ; Selma R. Co. v.
Lipton, 5 Ala. 787 (1843); Planters Co. v. Webb, 144 Ala. 666, 39 So. 562
(9o5); Mississippi & 0. R. R. Co. v. Cross, 20 Ark. 443 (1859); Jones v.
Dodge, 97 Ark. 248, 133 S. W. 828 (1911); Canfield v. Gregory, 66 Conn. 933,
33 AtI. 536 (1895) ; State Building Co. v. Pierce, 92 Iowa 668, 61 N. W. 426
(1894); Ramsey v. Peoria Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 55 Ill. 311 (1870); McCarthy v. Lavasche, 89 Ill. 27o (1878); Gill's Adm'x v. Ky. & Colo. Gold &
Silver Mining Co., 7o Ky. 635 (1870); Swartwout v. Michigan Air Line R.
Co., 24 Mich. 389 (1872); Central Plank Road Co. v. Clemens, 16 Mo. 359
(1852); Haskell v. Worthington, 94 Mo. 56o, 7 S. W. 481 (1888); Phoenix
Warehousing Co. v. Badger, 67 N. Y. 294 (1876); Lydell Ave. Lumber Co. v.
Lighthouse, 137 App. Div. 422, I2 N. Y. Supp. 802 (191o); Wadesboro Cotton Mills Co. v. Burns, 114 N. C. 353, 19 S. E. 238 (1894) ; Nickum v. Burckhardt, 30 Or. 464, 47 Pac. 788, 48 Pac. 475 (1897) ; McHose & Co. v. Wheeler,
45 Pa. 32 (1863); Francis Marion Hotel Co. v. Chicco, 131 S. C. 344, 127
S. E. 436 (1925); Panhandle Packing Co. v. Stringfellow, 18o S. W. 145
(Texas, 1915). It will be observed, however, that most of these cases depended upon estoppel.
" Collins v. Morgan Grain Co., Planters Co. v. Webb, both supra note i;
Snodgrass v. Zander, io6 Ark. 462, 154 S. W. 212 (1913) ; San Joaquin Co. v.
Beecher, ioi Cal. 70, 35 Pac. 349 (1894); National Bank v. Amoss, supra
note i; Macon Assn. v. Chance, 31 Ga. App. 636, 122 S. E. 66 (1924); Mc-
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between subscribers is the minority rule. 5

In some cases there

are special circumstances showing that the agreement in the particular case involved a contract with other persons as well as an

offer to the corporation, or was solely a contract between indi6
viduals.
It will be observed that both of these theories rest upon the
law of contracts. In each case the effort is to describe the situa-

tion in terms of offer and acceptance.

The subscription is the

offer to enter into a contract, and the theories differ only in their
conception of who is the offeree. The view that the subscriptionis a continuing offer to the prospective corporation seems to
overlook the point that in ordinary contract law there must not
only be an offer but someone to whom the offer is made. The
use of the word "continuing" must mean not merely that the offer

has not been withdrawn, but that it is as though the offer had
been made at the instant the offeree came into existence. The
transaction is forced into the molds of contract law by assuming
that an offer, made when there was ho offeree, was made when
there was an offeree, by simply designating the offer as "con-

tinuing."

The situation is helped but little by saying that the

offer is made to someone who acts as agent for the proposed
Cormick v. Great Bend Co., supra note I; U. S. Pump Co. v. Davis, 2 Kan.
App. 6ii, 42 Pac. 59o (1895); Bryant's Pond Co. v. Felt, Athol Music Hall
Co. v. Carey, both supra note i; Hudson Co. v. Tower, i56 Mass. 82, 3o N. E.
465 (1892); Intermountain Co. v. Jack, 5 Mont. 568, 6 Pac. 2o (1885);
Deschamps v. Loiselle, supra note i; Jermyn v. Searing & Co., 225 N. Y. 525,
122 N. E. 7o6 (i919); Yonkers Gazette Co. v. Taylor, supra note 2; Auburn
Bolt Works v. Shultz, 143 Pa. 256, 22 Atl. 904 (i8gi); Muncy Traction Engine Co. v. De La Green, i43 Pa. 269, 13 Atl. 747 (i888); Jeannette Bottle
Works v. Schall, 13 Pa. Super. 96 (i9oo); Hawthorn Bottle Co. v. Cribbs, 51

Pa. Super. 555 (I912); Kramer v. Hamsher, 63 Pa. Super. 211 (igi6);
Donaldson v. Rollman, 23 Pa. D. R. 802 (1914); Gleaves v. Brick Church
Turnpike Co., i Sneed 491 (Tenn. 1853) ; Lewis v. Hillsboro Roller Mill Co.,
23 S. W. 338 (Texas 1893); Elliott v. Ashby, 104 Va. 716, 52 S. E. 383
(1905) ; Greenbrier Industrial Exposition v. Rodes, 37 W. Va. 738, i7 S. E.

305

(893).

'Glenn v. Busey, 5 Mackey 223 (D. C. 1886) ; Hughes v. Antietam Co., 34
Md. 316 (1871); Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Davis, mtpra note x;
Lake Ontario, Auburn & N. Y. R. Co. v. Mason, i6 N. Y. 451 (I857); NonElectric Fibre Mfg. Co. v. Peabody, 21 App. Div. 247, 47 N. Y. Supp. 677
(1897); Clapp v. Gilt Edge Consolidated Mines Co., 33 S. D. 123, 144 N. W.
721 (1913); Windsor Hotel Co. v. Schenk, 76 W. Va. 1, 84 S. E. gii (i9i5)..
'Ada Dairy Assn. v. Mears, 123 Mich. 470, 82 N. W. 258 (igoo) ; Osburn

v. Crosby, 63 N. H. 583, 3 Atl. 429 (I886) ; Sanders v. Barnaby, Phila. Medical
Publishing Co. v. Wolfenden, both supra note 2; Garrett v. Phila. Lawn Mower
Co., 39 Pa. Super. 78 (i9o9).
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corporation, as we would then have the anomaly of an agent
for a non-existent principal.
On the other hand, the view that the subscription is a contract with the other subscribers meets with some difficulties. This
theory in its essence is that the subscriber adds to his express
offer to the proposed corporation an implied promise to the other
subscribers that he will not withdraw that offer, and that this
implied part of the transaction is binding at once. The trouble is
that in none of these cases are the other subscribers the plaintiffs,
nor does it appear from the language of the opinions upholding
the minority rule that an action could be maintained by the other
subscribers. This view appears to confuse the case of a simple
subscription with the less frequent case of an agreement between
persons in which they promise each other that they will form a
corporation, which agreement may of course include a subscription to stock.
It may not be impossible to work out either or both of these
theories on the basis of implied assignments, third party beneficiary rule, or some similar bit of ingenuity, so that they will do
no violence to the law of contracts and of agency. It is clear,
however, that no useful purpose would be served by so doing,
as the courts do not decide between the majority and the minority
rules on this basis. The real issue is not which theory cin be
brought into closer harmony with contract law rules, but whether
as a matter of policy subscriptions should be revocable until the
corporation is formed or not. A suggestion of this appears in
Bryant's Pond Steam Mill Co. v. Felt,7 in which after discussing
the contract situation the court adds:
"And in view of the fact that
often obtained by over persuasion,
hasty impulses, we are not prepared
law which allows such a revocation
dom. We think it is."

such subscriptions are
and upon sudden and
to say that the rule of
is not founded in wis-

It might be said in fairness to the policy of the opposite
view that the court's remarks as to over persuasion and hasty
'87 Me. 234, 32 AtI. 888 (1895), quoted with approval in Collins v. Morgan
Grain Co., infra note ii.
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impulses might just as well apply to stock subscriptions made
after incorporation, or indeed to any kind of promises to pay.
The question of the acceptance of the subscription can arise
only under the so-called majority rule. Under the other view
the subscriber cannot withdraw even before the formation of
the corporation, so it makes no difference whether the subscription is accepted after incorporation or not. Assuming the majority rule to be the law, the right to withdraw exists at least
until the offeree corporation comes into existence. The question then arises whether that right is terminated ipso facto the
moment the corporation comes into being, or whether it remains
until and unless there is an actual acceptance of the subscription
by the corporation. On this question authority is less abundant.
Among the cases following the majority rule, there are some
dicta stating or implying that the subscription becomes binding
as soon as the corporation is formed,8 and some indicating that
an actual acceptance after formation is necessary.' In none of
these cases was the question directly at issue in the sense that
a withdrawal had been attempted after the corporation was
formed but before an actual acceptance was made. The defense
in no case depended solely on a lack of acceptance, and the courts
were consequently under no necessity of defining the precise
moment at which the subscriptions became fully-formed contracts. The divergence of opinion shown in these cases therefore indicates that the rule on this point is still not definitely
fixed, rather than that there is a conscious division of authority.
San Joaquin Co. v. Beecher, supra note 4; Twin Creek Co. v. Lancaster,
79 Ky. 552 (1881); Bullock v. Falmouth Co., supra note I; Balfour v. Baker
City Gas Co., ihfra note 12; Auburn Bolt Works v. Shultz, 143 Pa. 256, 22
At. 9o4 (i8gi); Muncy Traction Engine Co. v. De La Green, 143 Pa. 269,
13 AU. 747 (1888) ; Bole v. Fulton, 233 Pa. 6o9, 82 At. 947 (1912) ; Jeannette
Bottle Works v. Schall, 13 Pa. Super. 96 (igoo); Kramer v. Hamsher, 63
Pa. Super. 211 (1916) ; Cartwright v. Dickenson, 88 Tenn. 476, 12 S. W. 1030
(89o).
'Collins v. Morgan Grain Co., infra note 1i; Stone v. Walker, 2O1 Ala.
130, 77 So. 554 (1917); McCormick v. Great Bend Co., supra note i; U. S.
Pump Co. v. Davis, supra note 4; Penobscot R. Co. v. Dummer, 40 Me. 172
(855); Bryant's Pond Co. v. Felt, supra note i; Red Wing Co. v. Friedrich,
26 Minn. 112, 1 N. W. 827 (879) ; Buffalo & Jamestown R. Co. v. Gifford, 87
N. Y. 294 (1882) ; Yonkers Gazette Co. v. Taylor, 30 App. Div. 334, 51 N. Y.
Supp. 969 (1898); Steely v. Texas Improvement Co., 55 Tex. Civ. App. 463,
119 S. W. 319 (19o9); Martin v. Rothwell, supra note i; Martin v. Cushwa,
86 W. Va. 615,

1O4

S. E. 97 (I92O).
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The Pennsylvania courts have laid down the definite rule
that the subscription can be withdrawn up to the time when the
certificate or application for charter is filed in the office of the
Secretary of the Commonwealth, and that at the moment of
filing the obligation of the subscriber becomes final. 10 It is difficult to see its justification other than as a rule of convenience.
The corporation has not come into existence when the application has been filed in the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth. The Governor may refuse to grant the charter, and if
he does grant it, the corporate existence does not date back to
the time the Secretary received the application. There are not
two contracting parties in existence any more than there were
at the time the subscription was made. Not only is there no
actual acceptance; even the existence of the promisee is still
lacking.
Taking one of the best considered and most recent cases on
the other side, we find in Collins v. Morgan Grain Co.," first, a
definite recognition, which is lacking in most of the cases, of the
fact that there is a division of authority on the question of withdrawal prior to incorporation, with a positive adoption of the
so-called majority rule; and second, a declaration that the subscriptions are not binding until "the corporations have been organized, and the subscriptions accepted."
If the law of contracts is applicable, and the majority rule
as to the subscriptions is adopted, it would seem that there should
be an actual acceptance. When the corporation is formed, we
have two potential contracting parties, plus an outstanding offer
made by one of them to the other. To constitute a contract there
must also be some kind of an acceptance, express or implied.
If the formation of the corporation, without more, makes the
subscription binding, it must be on the ground that the forma0

Auburn Bolt Works v. Shultz, 143 Pa. 256, 22 Atl. 904 (1891) ; Muncy
Traction Engine Co. v. De La Green, 143 Pa. 269, 13 AtI. 747 (1888) ; Jeannette Bottle Works v. Schall, 13 Pa. Super. 96 (19oo); Kramer v. Hamsher,
63 Pa. Super. 211 (1916). These cases speak indiscriminately of the time of
filing the certificate, and of the time when the incorporators are ready to file it.
It is submitted that they cannot literally mean the latter, as it is too indefinite;
and that the court has merely overlooked the fact that the two expressions are
not synonymous.
16 F.(2d) 253 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
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tion itself constitutes an implied acceptance. But how can the
mere coming into existence of a potential contracting party imply
an acceptance of offers made in anticipation of its existence?
The act of being born, in the case of a natural person, does not
involve the implied acceptance of any offers. No other kind of
an offer made to a prospective corporation is regarded as accepted
by the mere fact of its coming into being. Why should it be
implied that the new-born corporation desires to accept such
offers rather than to reject them, when it has as yet had no opportunity to do either?
In some cases facts appear which are clearly sufficient to
constitute an implied acceptance without doing violence to the
12
rules of contract law. Thus in Balfour v..Baker City Gas Co.,

while there was no express acceptance of the subscription, the
subscriber consented to the holding of the organization meeting,
and a stock certificate was made out in his name. Similarly, in
Cartwright v. Dickenson,'3 the subscriber was not only present
at the organization meeting but had paid part of the subscription and had served as a director, enough to show that both he
and the corporation were treating the subscription as an existing
contract. Such cases Of acceptance by conduct are clearly distinguishable from cases of unaccepted subscriptions, and yet the
court in the latter case says that "at the moment when the conditions required by law as preliminary to the granting of a charter were complied with the subscribers became shareholders." If
all the cases containing dicta of this kind showed such instances
of implied acceptance, the theory that acceptance is unnecessary
would quickly disappear. In some of the cases, however, there
is no such distinction on the facts, and the statements of the
courts cannot be so easily disposed of.
The chief cause of the confusion regarding the necessity for
acceptance appears to be a failure in many of the cases openly
to recognize, as is done in Collins v. Morgan Grain Co., 4 the
division of authority and the divergent theories on the question
227 Or. 300, 41 Pac. 164 (1895).

'88 Tenn. 476, 12 S. W.
'Supra note ii.

1030

(18go).
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of withdrawal. Thus in the Pennsylvania cases,' 5 the court follows the majority rule in permitting subscriptions to be withdrawn prior to incorporation, on the ground that they are "mere
proposals," but holds them to be binding the moment the application for charter is filed, asserting that "each subscriber contracts with his associates .

.

. and these mutual promises form

a valid and sufficient consideration." 16
The trouble here is that if the subscriptions are contracts
between the subscribers they are not "mere proposals," but are
binding at once. If they are mere proposals they are not contracts with the other subscribers, and their consideration is to be
found not in the other proposals, but in the undertaking of the
corporation, after it has accepted the subscription, to issue the
stock. The same paragraph contains language consistent with
both doctrines, which are not consistent with each other.
A court which adopts the rule that subscriptions can be
withdrawn prior to incorporation, must recognize that this rule
can only be based on the theory that the subscriptions are "mere
proposals" and are not already contracts. It should then adhere
to the reasoning of the rule and require the proposals to be accepted by the offeree as in the case of ordinary offers to contract, expressly or by actual implication. A court which prefers
to regard the subscription as a trilateral agreement, binding as
between the subscribers when made, should permit no withdrawal
at any time. Under neither view is there any justification for
the middle ground that the subscription is a mere offer when
made but becomes a contract without being accepted.
Pursuing the application of the law of contracts one step
further, the question arises whether, if actual acceptance of the
'Jeannette Bottle Works v. Schall, 13 Pa. Super. 96 (1900), and other
Pennsylvania cases cited supra note io.
" Also in several Pennsylvania cases not involving the question of withdrawal, the court utters the dictum that stock subscriptions are trilateral contracts, the other subscribers being party to them. If these dicta really represented Pennsylvania law, these cases would conflict with the withdrawal cases
given in note io, which they do not purport to do. See Groff v. Pittsburgh M.
Co., 31 Pa. 489 (1858); Phila. & Del. Co. R. Co. v. Conway, 177 Pa. 364, 35
At. 716 (1896) ; Marles Moulding Co. v. Stulb, 215 Pa. 91, 64 At. 431 (i9o6) ;
Wolf v. Excelsior Automatic Scale & Supply Co., 27o Pa. 547, I13 Atl. 569
(1921) ; Altoona Milk Co. v. Armstrong, 38 Pa. Super. 350 (19o9) ; Garrett v.
Phila. Lawn Mower Co., supra note 6.
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subscriptions is necessary, notice of the acceptance must be given
to the.subscriber. In Richelieu Hotel Company v. International
Company,'- it is held that such notice is unnecessary. It is difficult to see why the ordinary'rules regarding offer and acceptance
should be abandoned at this final stage. The acceptance of the
offer must ordinarily be communicated to the offeror, and no
logical reason appears for making an exception in this case.
The question remains whether any necessity exists for determining these questions of corporation law by the application
of the law of contracts. "Rules derived by a process of logical
deduction from pre-established conceptions of contract and obligation have broken down before the slow and steady and erosive
action of utility and justice." 18 It makes little practical difference which of the theories as to pre-incorporation subscriptions
is the more logical deduction from the law of contracts. It is
an important question in the law of corporations whether a subscriber may cancel his subscription at any time before the corporation is formed or not, and many questions of utility and
justice are involved, which are doubtless the factors of real
weight in the courts' decisions. It makes little difference that
it is out of harmony with contract law if the just and practical
rule is that subscriptions are binding immediately upon the formation of a corporation without the necessity of actual acceptance.
The opinions in such corporation cases still pay homage to
the law of contracts, but the frequent subordination of contract
logic to corporation utility and justice indicates that this is a situation to which Judge Cardozo's statement applies. The law
would be greatly clarified if the courts would, in cases of necessity, depart frankly from the contractual and agency bases, and
develop rules peculiar to the law of corporations.
140 IM. 248, at 266, 29 N. E. io44 (18go).
CARDozo, "THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS,"

99-100.

